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Abstract:  
The railroad package of 2001 focusing on access regulation is in the process of a re-
form. Particularly, the European Commission intends to remove the obstacles to fair 
competition that have been identified since 2001. In this context, the paper points out 
the relevance of the disaggregated regulatory approach. It is necessary to differentiate 
between infrastructure components which are monopolistic bottlenecks (e.g. railway 
tracks) and competitive components (e. g. service functions like ticketing). Competi-
tion on the markets for railway transport services requires non-discriminatory access to 
the railway infrastructures. As well the horizontal interoperability between national 
railway networks is a prerequisite that full competition on European markets for rail-
way services can evolve. Train access charges should provide incentives for the differ-
ent track companies to participate in collaborations offering international cross-border 
based track capacities, whereas a regulatory prescription of international track corri-
dors conflicts with the competence to allocate the track capacities of the different track 
companies. Finally, the complex question of the interplay between discrimination and 
the deficit problem is addressed in order to present solutions to avoid cross-
subsidization between track infrastructure and markets for transport services and to 
guarantee the efficient usage of public funds. 
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The regulatory reform process in Europe is gaining momentum, although strong-
ly characterized by its path dependency. Starting already two decades ago the 
long lasting vertical integration approach has been challenged. Until now two 
phases can be identified. Liberalisation of the markets for train services started 
in 1991. Based on the Directive 91/440/EC
1
 
, there was no doubt that competi-
tive supply of train services requires non-discriminatory access to railway infra-
structures. However market power regulation of access charges was only intro-
duced ten years after by the first railroad infrastructure package of 2001. The 
purpose of the three European railway packages implemented during the last 
decade was to revitalise railway transport service markets by strengthening the 
entrepreneurial role of railroad companies and searching for a more transparent 
division between the role of the state and the markets in railroad industries.  
Nevertheless the functioning of competition on European railroad markets is still 
considered as unsatisfactory, due to insufficient track access regulation, interop-
erability gaps etc. According to a Communication from the Commission con-
cerning the development of a Single European Railway Area (European Com-
mission, 2010a, p. 6 f.), market access conditions are partly considered as not 
being sufficiently precise; as well interoperability issues are partly considered as 
entry barriers (p. 9); and the observable trend of less investment and funding in 
the railway sector and thus declining quality of infrastructure is seen as a further 
obstacle (p. 4 f.). In some states, lacking independence, competences and powers 
by national regulatory authorities are complained. E. g. it can take years before a 
regulatory measure against an anti-competitive practice is finally enforced (p. 7). 
 
To tackle these issues, the European Commission initiated a so called ‘Recast’ 
of the First Railway Package of 2001. Besides simplifying and consolidating the 
rules by merging the three directives of the first railway package into a single 
text, the ‘Recast’ is to clarify existing provisions and dissolve inconsistencies 
                                                 
1   Directive 91/440/EC of the Council of 29 July 1991 on the  development  of the 
Community's railways, OJ L 23, 24/08/1991.   2 
within the railway sector regulation identified during the last decennium. Thus 
the main goal of the ‘Recast’ is to increase competition on the railway markets 
by improving and partly guaranteeing access as well to rail-related services such 
as maintenance facilities, terminals, passenger information and ticketing facili-
ties etc. for freight and passenger trains (European Commission, 2010b, chapter 
2, section 4). In meantime, the Proposal of the European Commission has passed 
the first reading by the European Parliament with great majority (Council of the 
European Union, 2011). In the following we refer to the Recast version passed 
by the first reading of the European Parliament. It is analysed in section 3, inas-
much these additional access obligations can be legitimated by network specific 
market power localized by the network economic concept of monopolistic   
bottlenecks. 
 
In Germany, open access for commercial passengers exist since 1994. As well 
Sweden and UK meanwhile have a small amount of open access operation, 
whereas the most interesting open access case is Italy, where competition with 
Tren Italia on new high speed routes is active (Nash, 2011, p. 12 f.). However, 
in a lot of member states, there are still considerable differences regarding cross-
border train services between European countries as well in terms of the permis-
sion of cabotage. In countries like Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal and Spain railway based passengers transports between 
two points in one of these countries cannot be performed by a railway undertak-
ing registered in another member state or elsewhere. After all, in countries like 
Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Rumania, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic 
countries, meanwhile market access is open for profitable national rail passenger 
transport services; though these services must be provided under asymmetric 
market conditions, in competition with ordered and public subsidised rail pas-
senger transport services (IBM and Kirchner,  2011, p. 57 ff.). Since market 
opening will not be finished as long as train companies in Europe do have free 
entry to the markets for domestic passenger train services throughout Europe, 
the issue of cabotage – unfortunately not examined in depth by the ‘Recast’ – is   3 




 which was enforced in December 2009 is also considered. 
With regard to interoperability, the ‘Recast‘ emphasises the need of a better co-
ordination of allocation schemes to improve the attractiveness of rail for interna-
tional traffic (European Commission, 2010a, p. 9). A competitive bidding pro-
cess for well-specified train control regions could promote transnational compe-
tition on the market for train services. The issue of compatibility standards and 
interoperability from the perspective of competition is also not within the focus 
of the ‘Recast’. However the goal of removing administrative and technical bar-
riers has been reinforced by the Commission, in particular the removing of in-
teroperability barriers (European Commission, 2010a, p. 8 ff.). Therefore in-
teroperability from the perspective of competition is considered in section 4.  
 
A main goal of the ‘Recast‘ is to improve the framework for investment in rail-
ways by encouraging private and public engagements (Council of the European 
Union, 2011, Art. 8 ff.). This issue is partly discussed in section 5 by addressing 
the complex issues of discrimination, of deficit problems and of the efficient  
usage of public funds. 
 
The ‚Recast‘ as well tackles politico-economic issues. It aims to strengthen the 
power of national sector specific regulators particularly by extending its compe-
tencies regarding rail-related services (Council of the European Union, 2011, 
Art. 55 ff.). From an institutional perspective, meanwhile a lot of member states 
introduced sector-specific rail regulators (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, 
Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and UK). But still the ma-
jority of member states have not yet established a  sector-specific regulatory 
agency. In some countries railway regulation issues are still tackled by the min-
istry of transport, at the same time owing and controlling the incumbent railway 
undertaking (IBM and Kirchner, 2011, p. 59 f.). Politico-economic issues how-
ever are not in the focus of the present paper; but institutional issues are ad-
                                                 
2   Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repeal-
ing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007.   4 
dressed in section 2 in a broader sense. In particular the background of the ‘Re-
cast’ is explained using a brief overview on the EU railway reform process of 
the last decade. 
 
 
2.  The development of liberalization and regulation and the obstacles to 
competition in the European railway sector 
 
In order to analyze the role of competition and remaining need for regulation in 
infrastructure based industries as telecommunications, energy, the railway indus-
try the disaggregated approach to network industries is applied. In this respect, 
three vertically related network levels within the railway industry have to be dif-
ferentiated (Knieps, 2006). There is the railway track infrastructure, the system 
of traffic and safety controls and the passengers and freight transport services. 
Competition on the markets for train services and market power regulation – as 
far as monopolistic bottlenecks are concerned – is a precondition for efficient 
and customer friendly train services. 
 
In this respect the European reform of the railway sector started two decades 
ago. With a focus on accounting separation between infrastructure and opera-
tions, Directive 91/440/EC differentiates between two network levels, namely 
railroad infrastructure and infrastructure management to run the track based 
network and railway companies using the track paths for transport services. Is-
sues of licensing
3 and the allocation of track capacity as well as nondiscrimina-
tory access charges of international railway undertakings
4
                                                 
3   Directive 95/18/EC of the Council of 19 June 1995 on the licensing of railway under-
takings, OJ L 143, 27/06/1995. 
 were further issues 
already tackled in the nineties in order to provide access rights for international 
freight operators. But a thoroughgoing railway liberalisation process was not yet 
initiated by the EU. It started at the beginning of the last decade: 
4   Directive 95/19/EC of the Council of 19 June 1995 on the allocation of railway infra-
structure capacity and the charging of infrastructure fees, OJ L 143, 27.6.1995.   5 
-  A First Railway Package issued in 2001 contained three directives
5, refer-
ring to the improvement of competition, international freight rail services 
and the efficient use of infrastructure capacity and further directives in or-
der to eliminate technical and legal barriers
6
-  A further reform step was made with the Second Railway Package, focus-
ing on a legally and technically integrated European railway area. It was 
adopted by the European Commission in 2004 and it contains directives 
on rail safety
. The package in summary 
contains accounting separation between infrastructure management, 
freight services and passenger traffic, the requirement of non-
discriminatory track access charges and allocation of track capacity, the 
appointment of an independent sector regulatory body, a performance re-
gime and incentives for a self-financing infrastructure based on track ac-
cess charges (and public financing on the basis of multi-annual contracts). 
7, on the interoperability of European (high speed and con-
ventional) rail systems
8
                                                 
5   Directive 2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2001 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Communi-
ty’s railways, OJ L75/1, 15. 3. 2001; Directive 2001/13/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council Directive 95/18/EC 
on the licensing of railway undertakings, OJ L 75/26, 15. 3. 2001; Directive 
2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on 
the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use 
of railway infrastructure and safety certification, OJ L 75/29, 15. 3. 2001. 
 and on domestic and international freight services 
6   Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 
2001 on the interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail system, OJ L 
110, 20.04.2001 and Directive 96/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit insti-
tutions (recast), OJ L 177, 30.06.2006. 
7   Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on safety on the Community’s railways and amending Council Directive 
1995/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on 
the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use 
of railway infrastructure and safety certification, OJ L 220, 21.06.2004, amended by 
Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 16 Decem-
ber 2008, OJ L 345, 23.12.2008. 
8   Directive 2004/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 amending Council Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-
European high-speed rail system and Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on the interoperability of the trans-European conventional 
rail system, OJ L 220, 21.06.2004.   6 
on the entire European network from 1 January 2007
9 and a regulation
10
-  Finally a Third Railway Package, consisted by two further directives and 
a regulation
 
as a legal basis to establish a European railway agency. 
11
 
, was adopted by the European Commission in September 
2007. The main focus of the package was to liberalise international pas-
senger traffic services within the EU by 2010. 
In  the course of the implementation of the railway packages, rail operators 
meanwhile are able to run national and international rail freight transport ser-
vices within and between EU countries. As well markets for international pas-
senger services are open. Any licensed railway undertaking has the right to 
transport passengers at any station along international routes in competition with 
domestic operators. However, in terms of liberalisation issues, particularly the 
implementation of the first railway package is still unsatisfactory. As main ob-
stacles to competition most often the European Commission stresses a lack of 
independence between railway infrastructures and railway services with regard 
to integrated operators, a lack of transparency of access conditions, discrimina-
tory track access charging and allocation of track capacity, still not appointed 
independent regulators and insufficient incentives to reduce cost (European 
Commission, 2006, p. 10. f.; Everis et al., 2010, p. 127). Accordingly, in June 
                                                 
9   Directive 2004/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Communi-
ty’s railways, OJ L 220, 21.06.2004. 
10  Regulation (EC) 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 establishing a European railway agency, OJ L 164, 21.6.2004, amended by 
Regulation (EC) 1335/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16  
December 2008, OJ L 354, 31.12.2008. 
11  Directive 2007/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2007 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Communi-
ty’s railways and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure 
capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure, OJ L 315, 
03.12.2007. Its aim is to open the market for international passenger services to 
competition from 1 January 2010; Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the certification of train drivers operating 
locomotives and trains on the railway system in the Community, OJ L 315, 
03.12.2007; Regulation (EC)  1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations, OJ L 315, 
03.12.2007.   7 
2008 the Commission addressed infringement letters to 24 of 25
12 concerned 
member states with the request to correctly implement the first railway package. 
Some of them followed the request and continued to implement EU rules 
properly. However, thirteen member states
13 did not comply with the request, 
why the Commission brought the matter before the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union according to Art. 258 of the Treaty
14
 
 (Everis et al., 2010, p. 130 ff.). 
Currently infringement procedures continue in the cases of the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia and 
Spain. 
 
3.  The reform of access regulation 
 
3.1   Identification of monopolistic bottlenecks within railroad systems 
 
A major goal of the ‘Recast’ is to strengthen market power regulation to exhaust 
the potentials of competition on the markets for train services. From the perspec-
tive of the disaggregated regulatory approach firstly, the proper regulatory basis 
has to be identified, secondly proper regulatory instruments should be applied to 
the minimal regulatory basis. 
 
In contrast to telecommunications regulation where a three criteria test in mean-
time has been developed which is compatible to network economic foundations 
(Blankart, Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007) railroad regulation is applied by ad hoc 
specification of rail infrastructure elements to be access regulated. In contrast to 
the first railroad package focusing on railroad tracks and stations, Annex III of 
the ‘Recast’ also considers service facilities like train formation facilities,   
storage sidings, port facilities, maintenance as components which the minimum 
                                                 
12  Malta and Cyprus don’t have a railway network. 
13  The member states were Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 
14  European Commission, Rail services: Commission legal action against 13 Member 
States for failing to fully implement first railway package, Press Release, IP/10/807 
of 24 June 2010, Brussels.    8 
access package should comprise, irrespective whether these components can   
also be offered by alternative providers (Council of the European Union, 2011, 
Annex III).  
 
In order to avoid an oversized regulatory basis apt the theory of monopolistic 
bottleneck is of particular relevancy (c. f. Knieps 1997, p. 327 ff.). The charac-
teristics of a monopolistic bottleneck are met when: 
(1)  A facility is necessary for reaching customers because no active substitute 
is available. This is the case if the relevant market is characterized by a 
natural monopoly situation, and one provider can offer this facility at 
lower cost than several providers; and 
(2)  At the same time, the facility cannot economically feasible be duplicated 
and thereby no potential substitute is available. This holds if the costs of 
the facility are irreversible. 
 
Since irreversible costs are no longer decision-relevant for the incumbent 
whereas potential entrants have to decide whether to incur these irreversible  
investments. Thus, irreversible costs in combination with a natural monopoly 
create a credible threat potential for the incumbent. If for example a potential 
competitor would plan an entry with a parallel track, the incumbent railway 
owner could threaten to reduce his tariffs to the short- run variable costs, dis-
couraging a second rail infrastructure provider. Once a railway network is com-
pleted, further entry with additional tracks cannot be expected. The decision-
relevant costs of entry include the costs of track infrastructure, which cannot be 
covered by tariffs according to short-run variable costs. Since neither active nor 
potential competition can be expected the incumbent provider of track access 
possesses stable market power (Knieps 2005, p. 24). 
 
Under absence of natural monopoly this credible threat no longer holds, because 
the relevant market is sufficiently large to allow two active viable providers of 
network components. Thus the question arises which of the components listed in 
Annexes I, II and III of the ‘Recast’ (Council of the European Union, 2011) may 
be provided by at least two firms even if irreversible costs are involved. Where-  9 
as tracks, passenger stations and freight terminals typically are characterized as 
monopolistic bottlenecks; there may be sufficient room for alternative providers 
of maintenance facilities and other service related markets. Storage siding and 
train formation facilities are based on track facilities which are characteristised 
as monopolistic bottlenecks, whereas logistic activities of train formation belong 
to the market of railway traffic services. 
 
For the case that there are no irreversible costs due to potential competition, 
network specific market power does not exist even in the case of a natural mo-
nopoly. Thus, train control systems are not monopolistic bottlenecks although 
technical regulation in enforcing the control borderlines is required. Potential 
competition in form of a competitive bidding procedure should work.  
 
In article 13 of the ‘Recast’ (Council of the European Union, 2011) the criterion 
of a dominant position in at least one of the railway transport service markets is 
applied for regulating the provision of service facilities on those transport ser-
vice markets. The question arises whether such a regulation is justified by net-
work specific market power. Since network specific market power does not orig-
inate on the markets for network services regulation should be limited to the 
market power at its roots. Thus, instead of regulating the components of 




3.2   Incentive regulation versus cost-based regulation 
 
The focus of the ‘Recast’ is on cost-based regulation of pricing structures 
whereas the disaggregated regulatory approach is based on price-cap regulation, 
leaving the pricing structure flexible under the entrepreneurial flexibility of the 
owner of the monopolistic bottleneck components. Starting point is the market 
for infrastructure capacities, in particular track capacities. The ruling in Article 
28 of the ‘Recast’ (states that agreements between train companies (railway un-
dertakings) and infrastructure managers should be non-discriminatory and trans-
parent , that charging scheme in use is based on the same principles over the   10 
whole network resulting in equivalent and non-discriminatory charges for dif-
ferent train companies. As long as access to monopolistic bottleneck compo-
nents is required, active and potential competition cannot mitigate market pow-
er, guaranteeing non-discriminatory access via private bargaining (Knieps 2006, 
p. 151). Thus the non-discriminatory and transparency requirements of access 
charges are justified. Principles of charging (Articles, 31-37, Annex VIII of the 
‘Recast’) are laid down in the “flavor” of traditional cost-based regulation well-
known from traditional regulations in telecommunications and electricity sector. 
Charges for the minimum access package should be based on the cost directly 
incurred caused by infrastructure usage (wear and tear) resulting from operating 
the train. Mark-ups on the basis of demand elasticities for infrastructure access 
are allowed in order to obtain full recovery of the infrastructure costs (Article 32 
of the ‘Recast’). However efficient allocation of track capacities based on scarci-
ty prices is still missing. Instead, if an infrastructure has been declared to be 
congested, the infrastructure manager may employ priority criteria to allocate 
infrastructure capacity. In particular international freight services should be giv-
en adequate consideration in determining priority criteria (Article 47/5 of the 
‘Recast’). However the question on the consistency of the ‘Recast’ arises wheth-
er the allocation of infrastructure capacities can be based on legally prescribed 
ad hoc criteria, and at the same time being discriminatory-free. In contrast the 
principles of incentive regulation would leave the entrepreneurial flexibility to 
the infrastructure companies to develop access charging systems reflecting the 
relevant opportunity costs of infrastructure capacities and simultaneously creat-
ing the proper investment incentives for capacity extensions.  
 
 
4.  Interoperability from the perspective of competition on the markets for 
train services 
 
According to Article 3 of the ‘Recast’ (Council of the European Union, 2011), 
infrastructure managers are responsible for establishing, managing and main-
taining railway infrastructure including traffic management, whereas these func-
tions may be executed by different actors. 
   11 
The entrepreneurial flexibility to allocate infrastructure capacities is also im-
portant from the transborder perspective of international train services. The con-
struction of international train paths and a related demand for a one-stop-shop 
for rail corridors requires the cooperation between the infrastructure managers 
owing the competency of capacity allocation of the individual network. The 
conclusions of the ‘Recast’ can be supported, that this goal may result into the 
establishment of a joint body by the infrastructure managers dealing with the 
construction of international train paths (Article 43/2; 44/5 of the ‘Recast’). 
Since the track capacities should remain under the entrepreneurial competency 
of the railroad infrastructure the construction and implementation of internation-




The provision of train services requires simultaneous access to rail infrastructure 
and traffic control system, regardless of whether these functions are provided by 
a vertically integrated enterprise or by different undertakings. A precondition for 
competition on the markets for train services is that train companies have non-
discriminatory access not only to railway infrastructure but also have access to 
the different train control systems. Train control systems are the decisive link 
between railway infrastructure capacities and train operations. The throughput of 
train traffic as well as repairs of infrastructure components (tracks etc.) must be 
co-ordinated by train control systems. The cost of such coordination depends on 
the number of trains and their operating speeds rather than the number of train 
companies active on the network. The geographical borderlines of train control 
systems have to be clearly defined and enforced by technical regulation. How-
ever, this does not imply that train control systems would have the characteris-
tics of a monopolistic bottleneck. Computer software and know-how required 
needed to set-up a train control system are not geographically sunk. Thus, com-
petitive bidding procedures via auctioning of a predefined geographical train 
                                                 
15  It is interesting to note that in September 2010 not only the European Commission’s 
Proposal on the Recast was initiated, but also a Regulation (EU) No. 913/2010 of  
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 concerning a  
European rail network for competitive freight has been adopted (OJ L 276/22, 
20.10.2010). Although directly applicable law this regulations remains rather vague 
about the future role of regulatory agencies regarding the implementation of freight 
rail corridors in Europe (Otte, 2011, p. 2).    12 
traffic control area for a well-definedperiod of time can work. The result is 
awarding the contract to the bidder who is able to offer the train control service 
at the lowest prices while at the same time covering the required costs. From the 
perspective of a European market for train services intense co-ordination and 
harmonization of train control systems is required allowing systematic internali-
sation of cross-border restrictions either by integrated technical solutions or ade-
quate compatibility standards (Knieps 2006, p. 15 f.).  
 
Whereas interoperability issues were first considered in the context of the trans-
European high-speed rail system (Directive 96/48/EC), interoperability of the 
trans-European conventional rail system (Directive 2001/16 EC) became also 
relevant after the first railroad package.  
 
According to the European Commission lack of interoperability still creates sig-
nificant barriers to entry in the EU market for train services. Although some 
progress with interoperability specifications for high-speed and conventional rail 
would have been achieved, further harmonization of technical specifications for 
interoperability (TSI) would remain necessary. In particular the phasing-out of 
old national oriented systems and their replacement by European Rail Traffic 
Management System /ERMTS. Whereas at present TSI are applicable only to 
the Trans-European Network, the whole railway system in Europe should have 
harmonized specifications by 2013 (European Commission, 2010a, p. 8). The 
role of the European Commission has been strong by subsidizing the develop-
ment of ERTMS specifications by funding up to 50 % of the standardization ef-
forts for the development of the new European interoperability standard. The 
European Rail Agency (ERA) was founded with the task to support the interop-
erability efforts of the European railroads and in particular the development of 
ERTMS (de Tilière, 2011, p. 19).
16
                                                 
16  See also Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within the Community (Recast), 
OJ L191/1, 18.7.2008. 
 Although the ‘Recast’ is not particularly fo-
cusing on the European harmonization process of train traffic control systems a  
temporary  reduction of the infrastructure charge for trains equipped with the 
European Train Control System (ETCS) running on lines equipped with national   13 
command control and signaling systems shall be granted (Article 32 (3) of the 
‘Recast’). In order to get the bandwagon moving towards competition on the 
markets for crossborder rail traffic this efforts of the European Community to-
wards increasing interoperability of rail traffic management systems are indeed 
necessary. Nevertheless, the danger of over-standardization regarding train 
equipment etc. should be avoided. 
 
 
5.  Deficits and the efficient usage of public funds 
 
It is important to differ between the regulatory task of market power regulation, 
the political task to decide on public subsidies and the entrepreneurial task of 
rail infrastructure providers and rail traffic service providers. Liberalization of 
network industries such as telecommunications, energy, etc. mainly focuses on 
adequate sector specific access regulations. An additional important element in 
the railway sector, however, is railway traffic delivered on order and payment. 
Concomitantly some railway network undertakings like high-speed lines are 
supposed to be profitable, but a lot are partly state-subsidized on the basis of 
governmental performance and funding agreements. In a nutshell, the general 
financing scheme for liberalised railway network undertakings therefore are ac-
cess charges on the one hand and public subsidies on the other. The reference 
point is the necessity to cover the decision-relevant cost of infrastructure provi-
sion, including the opportunity cost of the invested capital which an efficient 
enterprise would have to bear. Thus, the costs of efficient provision of infra-
structure capacities have to be covered by the sum of access charges and public 
subsidies. 
 
Most important to notice is that entrepreneurial decisions regarding investment, 
product design, pricing etc. require a forward looking costing standard (current 
cost accounting). Only a decision relevant costing methodology is able to reflect 
the costs of an efficient railway undertaking. The standard for determining the 
efficient costs should under no circumstances be determined by the regulator. It 
has to be developed within the railway company. Historical costs as a test object 
are ineffectual because historical cost accounting focuses on irrelevant cost in-  14 
formation with respect to entrepreneurial decisions (Knieps und Weiss, 2009, p. 
146 ff.). The regulatory authority’s responsibility is to fix non-discriminatory 
access prices on the basis of the forward looking costing of the access regulated 
firm. 
 
The costs of an efficient railway service provision should be determined by for-
ward looking investment modeling (volume) and a decision-oriented valuation 
of user cost of capital and operating costs. As well migration costs of upgrading 
strategies and the potential of efficiency improvements are to be taken into ac-
count (Knieps, 2007, p. 13 ff.). In this context, the problem of financing defi-
cient rail infrastructures has to be solved. The need for subsidies can only be de-
termined by the decision-oriented costing accounting of the infrastructure man-
ager. 
 
Unfortunately the decision relevant costs of railway undertakings including pub-
lic service obligation in many cases are hardly known. Railway undertakings 
often calculate costs based on historical cost accounting rather than decision ori-
ented forward looking cost accounting. The other fact is non-transparent subsidy 
flows to cover railway deficits (Nera, 2004; Ecorys, 2006). However it has been 
stated that financial budgets of the public sector for railways have more than 
doubled in half a decade, whereas the income from operating services and infra-
structure management have risen only by about 40 percent (SCI, 2009, p. 18f.). 
 
Countries often focus on distribution policy when subsidising railway undertak-
ings (industrial, regional, environmental policy, etc.). After all, to limit associat-
ed negative effects on the efficiency of the provision of transport services, there 
are  guidelines on state aid for railway undertakings (European Commission, 
2008). For example, state aid is allowed to support railway undertakings in order 
that they are able to buy and renew vehicles in time and therefore are in a better 
position to compete with less environmental friendly modes of transport. 
“Member States may also accord the infrastructure manager, having due regard 
to Articles 77, 92 and 93 of the Treaty, financing consistent with the tasks, size 
and financial requirements, in particular in order to cover new investment” (Di-
rective 91/440/EC, Article 7, section 3). However, this legislation cannot pre-  15 
vent large unexplained differences across countries regarding governmental sub-
sidies for railway infrastructure investment. 
 
State subsidies vary widely between countries. This is shown by the sum of the 
ratio of public funds to the sum of the railway undertakings operating revenues 
per country based on operating revenues and public funds from the country re-
ports of SCI (2009). In Western European countries, public funding varies be-
tween about 20% and 60% of the total revenue of railway undertakings. The 
numbers are calculated as averages of the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 (see figure 
1). 
 




Source:  Based on Fischer et al. (2011, p. 19). 
 
As well government subsidies vary widely between different railway undertak-
ings in these countries. The differences are particularly significant when com-



































Government grants  Operating revenue   16 
It is therefore of interest to find and apply stable regulations, leading to more 
efficient railway infrastructure and transport services and fewer deficits (see as 
well Knieps and Weiss, 2009, p. 161 ff.). From the perspective of network eco-
nomics, incentive compatible access regulations and efficient subsidies are a 
precondition that competition in the markets for rail traffic can be fully exploit-
ed. Therefore a clear-cut localization and separate accounting for monopolistic 
bottleneck areas in combination with adequate regulation of access conditions is 
required. As outlined in section 3, rail infrastructure networks are characterised 
by monopolistic bottleneck areas. Sector specific market power regulation is 
needed to discipline owners of monopolistic bottlenecks. Sunk costs of railway 
track infrastructure give the incumbent operator a strategic advantage. There-




A merit of the ‚Recast‘ is its emphasis on accounting separation for the railway 
infrastructure, the track and related equipment (the monopolistic bottleneck) and 
the operation of rail services (different accounts for passenger transport services 
under public service obligation and freight transport services) in order to avoid 
cross subsidies and discrimination practices and easier measurement of perfor-
mance. Accounting separation in addition is deemed as “a safeguard against 
State funds devoted to unprofitable activities being shifted to subsidise commer-
cial activities and is thereby necessary for avoiding distortion of competi-
tion“(European Commission, 2010b, p. 6). It is also conclusively, that the ‘Re-
cast’ refrains to demand a regulation on the vertical separation of train transport 
services and the railway infrastructure. However until the end of 2012 the Euro-
pean Commission will present a draft directive to the separation issue.
18
                                                 
17  It is important to note, that ordering and subsidising deficitary railway infrastructures 
is to be distinguished from ordering deficitary transport services (Knieps und Weiss, 
2009; Knieps, 2010). In the latter case competitive tendering is an efficient way,  
because railway transport services– as opposed to the provision of railway track in-
frastructure and strategic behavior of infrastructure managers – are not associated 
with sunk costs. Insofar, the most efficient and cost-effective service provider can be 
determined by competitive tendering, thus, the provider that requires the lowest sub-
sidy. 
 
18  For an in depth analyses of vertical separation issues within the railway industry see 
OECD, 2005; OECD 2006; RGL Forensics et al., 2009).   17 
In this context, the proposal of horizontal accounting separation is of particular 
interest (Weiß, 2011). The first step is to differentiate between profitable core 
networks and non-profitable peripheral networks. Profitable networks are sub-
ject to price-cap regulation. Non-profitable parts are subject to politically de-
sired subsidies to the extent that track access charges do not cover the decision-
relevant total costs. The decision how to finance the deficit is not in the compe-
tence of the sector specific regulator. The question of a subsidy from tax reve-
nues is up for democratic debate. Government subsidies are to be legitimised 
politically and fixed accordingly. Such a clear-cut separation of competences 
between regulation and policy then allows both, efficient access charges and the 
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